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THE EFFECT OF INCENTIVE-INDUCED RETIREMENT ON SPOUSAL
RETIREMENT RATES: EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL EXPERIMENT
HANS BLOEMEN, STEFAN HOCHGUERTEL and JOCHEM ZWEERINK∗
We identify, quantify, and explain the impact of incentive-induced early retirement
(ER) of husbands on their wives’ probability to retire within 1 year, using administrative
data from the Netherlands. Our identification strategy is based on a policy intervention
by which targeted individuals working at the central government level became unexpect-
edly and temporarily eligible for very generous ER benefits. This retirement window of
opportunity implied for interested workers that transitions from the current job into full
retirement had to be effected swiftly and irreversibly. We find that induced ER of hus-
bands increased their wives’ probability to retire by 10 percentage points. This is a
strong and robust local average treatment effect. Partly, the effect runs through wives
at ages when they may have been eligible for ER programs themselves. (JEL C26, J26,
J120, J140)
I. INTRODUCTION
Large changes across Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development countries
are being observed in labor force participation
and retirement patterns of older workers. In par-
ticular, average ages at final labor force with-
drawal are higher now than they used to be in
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previous decades, although strong inter-country
differences remain (Blundell, Bozio, and Laroque
2013; Schirle 2008). These changing patterns
have partly been ascribed to changes in institu-
tions such as restricted access to early retirement
(ER), or disability insurance (DI). Understanding
the way individuals make labor supply and retire-
ment decisions is crucial for designing effective
policies that are meant to change behavior. Tra-
ditional microeconomic retirement models that
can guide policy makers in their choice typically
focus on individual worker decisions in isola-
tion and study the decision process as a function
of age, income, health, wealth, and financial or
tax incentives (Berkovec and Stern 1991; Gust-
man and Steinmeier 1986; Lumsdaine, Stock,
and Wise 1992; Rust and Phelan 1997). As a
recent strand of literature has emphasized, how-
ever, labor force decisions of spouses are interre-
lated through various channels. Ignoring effects
on labor supply of policy-targeted individuals’
spouses may have direct implications for the
evaluation of such policy measures (Blau and
Gilleskie 2006; Gustman and Steinmeier 2009;
Van Der Klaauw and Wolpin 2008).
ABBREVIATIONS
ELSA: English Longitudinal Study of Aging
HRS: Health And Retirement Study
IV: Instrumental Variable
LATE: Local Average Treatment Effect
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This paper studies whether shocks to ER
incentives, relevant for certain employees in the
age group 55–60, actually led to earlier labor
force outflow, and whether it may have had
spillover effects on retirement behavior of the
spouses of those targeted. The policy change that
we exploit became effective in 2005 for certain
birth cohorts of civil servants employed for more
than 10 years by the Dutch central government.
These individuals were offered the opportunity to
retire during the year 2005, by a temporary reduc-
tion of the ER eligibility age. For our empirical
work, we focus on dual-earner couples in which
the husband did not and the wife did work in
the private sector, such as to rule out coincidental
treatment of wives through the same reform.
After studying the intention-to-treat effect by
means of a difference-in-difference specifica-
tion, we employ an instrumental variable (IV)
approach to estimate the effect of induced retire-
ment on spousal retirement status. The changed
ER incentive for civil servants serves as an exoge-
nous shifter of retirement. In other words, our
identification strategy relies on an unforeseen
window of opportunity that opened up for a spe-
cific group of workers, and not on fixed and well-
known age rules. Identification makes use of pri-
vate sector workers that were unaffected by the
same reform.
A worker’s retirement can affect spousal
retirement through various channels and in
different directions. Upon the retirement of an
individual, the spouse may postpone her or his
own retirement to prevent drops in household
income. Alternatively, spouses may retire simul-
taneously, because they enjoy spending leisure
time together such that retirement of one spouse
induces the retirement of the other. Without
instrumenting retirement status, estimates of
the effect of retirement on spousal retirement
status are likely to be biased. Bias may arise if
men and women with similar preferences tend to
match, or if spouses with a preference for joint
retirement select themselves into jobs that enable
them to do so.
The wife’s probability to retire is the main
dependent variable in our IV model. We employ
the mentioned policy change as an instrument for
husband’s retirement status, providing variation
in husbands’ retirement rates across public sec-
tor (treated) and private sector (control) employ-
ees, and over time. Lack of a sufficient number
of observations on wives that were induced to
retire through the reform and who had working
husbands precludes us from providing a simi-
lar analysis for women’s retirement and possible
spillover effects on husbands.1
Using Dutch administrative micro data at
the population level, we find reliable evidence
for an effect of induced ER for husbands in
the first stage. A reduced form difference-in-
difference analysis of the husband’s changed
financial incentives to retire early shows clear
and nearly immediate spillover effects on his
wife’s retirement decision. The second stage of
our IV approach confirms the robust and positive
impact of the husband’s predicted retirement
status on his wife’s retirement.
According to our central estimates, retirement
of male civil servants induced by the policy
change led to a jump in the probability of their
wives to retire within 12 months by 10 percent-
age points. An alternative reduced form analysis
of the wives’ ages shows that the effect is driven
by husbands whose wives may have been eligi-
ble for regular ER benefits themselves. This result
may be explained by the presence of leisure com-
plementarities. If husbands are induced to retire,
wives who do not forego a financially attrac-
tive retirement opportunity may quit working as
well, so as to spend their leisure time together
with their spouses. Husbands with wives who
reach the eligibility age for regular ER bene-
fits may also be more likely to accept an ER
offer themselves.
We directly contribute to a recent empirical
literature that estimates the effect of incentive-
induced retirement of one partner on retirement
status of the spouse. The identification methods
used in this literature rely on the relevant incen-
tives being exogenous sources of variation in the
retirement rates. Banks, Blundell, and Casanova
Rivas (2010) is the study most comparable to
ours, based on survey data, however. They find
that spousal decisions can be influenced by retire-
ment shifts of their partners. They use varia-
tion in eligibility ages for ER benefits between
countries as source of variation in the probabil-
ity to retire. We exploit variation in retirement
rates across sector, age, and time. Whereas it
1. One underlying cause is the relatively weak labor
market attachment of women, in particular for the ages and
birth year cohorts affected by the policy change we study.
Husbands having reached eligibility ages for ER benefits is
a restricting factor as well. Husbands of wives in the age
category 55–60 were typically in their late 50s or early 60s.
Early retirement arrangements in the private sector typically
offered early retirement as of age 60, so that many of those
husbands in their early 60s were already retired.
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is common to rely on fixed age rules in related
papers, a remaining objection is that workers may
retire or postpone retirement while anticipating
the retirement of their spouses. Such anticipation
effects could bias the estimated treatment effect
upwards or downwards. Our research design,
relying on a shock to eligibility conditions, avoids
this in principle.
Our first contribution is to use strong instru-
ments that provide exogenous (unanticipated)
variation in retirement rates of husbands. Sec-
ond, we use administrative data that include end
dates of jobs and that allow us to observe the
precise within-couple sequencing of retirement.
This is critical in order to rule out that our esti-
mates are influenced by behavior of wives that
actually retired earlier than their husbands. The
latter effect cannot necessarily be ruled out in
studies that are based on biennial survey data,
posing a potential threat to identification. Third,
as we have access to data covering the entire pop-
ulation, we can focus on individuals from a very
narrow age range with a specific career.
The rest of the paper is set up as follows.
Section II reviews the relevant related literature
and Section III describes the institutional envi-
ronment, including the policy change that we
exploit. Section IV explains and describes the
data. Section V delineates the identification strat-
egy we use for estimating the causal effect of hus-
band’s retirement on wife’s retirement status, and
discusses results. Section VI concludes.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Structural models of joint retirement assume
that husbands and wives make separate retire-
ment decisions and have their own preferences.
Papers such as Blau and Gilleskie (2006) and
Van Der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008) carefully
model the incentives provided by social security
rules, and specify stochastic processes for wages,
health, and survival. The main effect of husbands’
on wives’ retirement choices runs through the
household budget constraint in those papers.
The household budget constraint is not the only
channel inducing dependence, however. Spouses
enjoy spending time together, that is, spousal
preferences directly depend on one another
(Gustman and Steinmeier 2000, 2009; Hurd
1990). Gustman and Steinmeier (2000), studying
retirement choices assuming absence of uncer-
tainty, find that spouses coordinate retirement
decisions and that this coordination is motivated
by leisure complementarities rather than finan-
cial incentives provided by the household budget
constraint. Casanova Rivas (2010) does take into
account uncertainty regarding future income,
health, and survival. In line with Gustman and
Steinmeier (2000), she finds evidence for leisure
complementarities. Michaud and Vermeulen
(2011) employ a structural approach incorporat-
ing intrahousehold interactions and find evidence
for leisure complementarities as well.
A second strand of empirical literature esti-
mates the effect of incentive-induced retirement
of one partner on retirement status of the spouse.
Zweimueller, Winter-Ebmer, and Falkinger
(1996) estimate a bivariate probit model, where
the dependent variables are the retirement sta-
tuses of the husband and the wife. The retirement
status of each of the partners depends on the
social security variables of both spouses. Using
data from the Austrian Microzensus, the authors
find that husbands responded to a change in the
minimum retirement age of their wives whereas
wives did not respond to a change in the min-
imum retirement age of their husbands. Baker
(2002) estimates the effect of a decrease in the
eligibility age for age-related income security
benefits for workers on labor force participation
of spouses in Canada, for a sample of workers
who were younger than their spouses. He uses
data from the Canadian Survey of Consumer
Finances. The author finds that eligibility for
the age-related benefits for wives was associated
with a 6–7 percentage point decrease in labor
force participation of husbands. He does not
find an association between eligibility for the
age-related benefits of husbands and labor force
participation of wives.
Banks, Blundell, and Casanova Rivas (2010)
employ a difference-in-difference approach,
exploiting the difference in eligibility ages for
ER benefits between England and the United
States as a source of variation in retirement
status. They use data from 2002 to 2004 waves
of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) for
the United States and the English Longitudinal
Study of Aging (ELSA) for England. The authors
find that men in England were 14–20 percentage
points more likely to retire within 2 years when
their wives reached the ER age than comparable
men in the United States. These effects are found
for three subsamples of men who were at least
as old, at least 1 year older, or at least 2 years
older than their wives. The authors do not find an
effect if they do not restrict their sample based
on age differences between men and their wives.
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Stancanelli (2017) employs a sharp Regres-
sion Discontinuity design, using the youngest ER
age in France (the age of 60) as the discontinu-
ity in the probability to retire. She uses data from
the French Labor Force Surveys (LFS), and finds
a negative effect of retirement on the partner’s
hours worked, both for males and females. Lalive
and Parrotta (2017) employ a double regres-
sion discontinuity design on Swiss data and find
that wives reduce their labor force participation
by 2–3 percentage points when their husbands
reach pension eligibility. They do not find such
spillovers for husbands.
Selin (2017) has a similar finding for
spillovers for husbands, exploiting a pension
reform in Sweden. Broad categories of local
government workers were eligible for full pen-
sion benefits at the age of 63 until 2001, but
lost eligibility in the 2001 reform. The author
estimates a difference-in-difference model using
administrative data and does not find evidence
for a response in husbands’ retirement behavior
to their wives’ changed retirement incentives.
III. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND POLICY
CHANGE
We shall focus on targeted incentives to retire
early that became available to a group of civil ser-
vants in the Netherlands.2 The Dutch retirement
system foresees retirement at the standard age
(for both men and women) of 65. Actual average
ages of entering retirement have been consider-
ably lower, however, because of the widespread
use of ER arrangements in virtually all sectors of
the economy.3
The Dutch pension system rests on three pil-
lars. The first pillar is the public old-age pension
system, which is financed on a pay-as-you-go
basis. The second pillar consists of occupational
pensions. Regular pensions are funded. ER pen-
sions are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. The
third pillar consists of private provisions. We
study the period around 2005. At that time, most
occupational pension funds offered ER arrange-
ments, allowing for retirement below the stan-
dard age of 65. Individual pension funds set their
own entry age for ER benefit receipt (on average
2. See also Bloemen, Hochguertel, and Zweerink (2017).
3. A concise description of the Dutch pension system and
existing early retirement arrangements for civil servants valid
at the time of our data can be found in Appendix A: There, we
also consider the role of competing pathways out of the labor
force, in particular DI.
just above the age of 60) and stipulated eligibil-
ity criteria. For instance, the public sector pension
fund offered ER arrangements as of the ages 61
or 62 onwards, that allowed continuing into reg-
ular pension benefit receipt from the age of 65
on. Retirement before reaching the ER eligibil-
ity age was financially very unattractive. The ER
benefits were financed with premiums, separately
from the regular pension benefits, and because
of a favorable tax treatment claiming ER bene-
fits upon eligibility was actuarially highly ben-
eficial. We use a temporary decrease in the ER
eligibility age for civil servants as a source of
exogenous variation to estimate the impact of
incentive-induced ER of husbands on their wives’
probability to retire within 1 year.4
This temporary decrease—which we refer
to as “the ER window”—was announced in
April 2004.5 The government aimed at reducing
and restructuring public sector tasks. Ministries
(departments) and their agencies qualified to offer
certain civil servants additional possibilities for
ER during the first 11 months of 2005, under the
provision that forced layoff (in the wake of reor-
ganizations) of younger civil servants could be
avoided.6 In practice, this was implemented by
offering ER collectively to all or none of the qual-
ifying workers within a qualifying department
(Dutch Government 2004). This aspect is vital for
the internal validity of our identification strategy,
because if employers had offered the incentive
selectively to such husbands who wished to spend
time with their retiring wives, for example, the
opening of the ER window would be endogenous
to the retirement status of wives. The ER win-
dow offered gross retirement benefits that could
be up to 70% of workers’ average pay (mid-career
salary), corresponding to benefit levels in other
ER programs.
Civil servants faced several eligibility crite-
ria for leaving within the ER window (Dutch
Government 2004, 2005), in particular age and
career-related norms. First, they had to be at
least 55 years old when retiring. Second, they
had to have been continuously employed as a
civil servant during the 10 years prior to retiring.
They were also required to have continuously
4. We consider a 12 month period, not a calendar year.
5. The term “retirement window” has been used before in
work studying similar types of policy reforms, for example,
Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1992), Börsch-Supan and Schn-
abel (1998), Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999) and Coe et al.
(2012).
6. Ministries and their agencies typically have thousands
of employees.
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contributed to the public sector pension fund
during the 10 years prior to ER. Importantly,
these requirements prevent self-selection into the
public sector of workers who would like to
retire early.
Employers then had to decide before January
1, 2005 whether or not to open the ER win-
dow as of January 1, 2005, and eligible civil ser-
vants were not allowed to retire later than Decem-
ber 1, 2005. These stipulations hence meant
that retirement decisions had to be taken swiftly
and irreversibly.
As the regular public sector ER arrangement
continued to be offered from ages 61 or 62 on,
the relevant treatment group for our natural exper-
iment thus contains individuals aged 55–60. We
compare with private sector workers of the same
age (control group), where such a window of
opportunity did not arise, and we compare before
and during the treatment year 2005.
It is important to realize, however, that not all
age groups within our treatment group will have
been exposed to an equally strong incentive to
retire. There are two reasons. One is a maximum
duration of ER benefits of 8 years under the win-
dow. There was no further provision for a possible
gap between expiration of ER benefits and start
of receipt of regular pension benefits from age
65 on. Civil servants aged 57 or older at the onset
of ER were not facing a coverage gap; those
aged 56 or younger would see their ER benefits
exhausted 1 or 2 years prior to normal pension
receipt eligibility. The other reason is differential
accrual possibilities for regular pension benefits.
In particular, civil servants born before January 1,
1948 could continue accruing pension claims at
a rate of 50% at the expense of the employer for
a maximum of 4 years. Civil servants born on or
later than January 1, 1948, that is, civil servants
who were in the age category 55–57 in 2005, did
not have this opportunity. In summary, the ER
window was thus very attractive for civil servants
aged 58 and older, somewhat less attractive for
those aged 57, but substantially less attractive for
civil servants aged 55 or 56. In our main analysis
we therefore differentiate our instrument by age,
allowing for heterogeneous treatment effects.
IV. DATA
We use administrative data collected and pre-
pared for research purposes by Statistics Nether-
lands. The observations we use cover the period
2000–2005 and include variables on job and
personal characteristics.7 The job characteristics
data provide information on all jobs that any reg-
istered individual has held. The job information
includes job spells (precise start and end dates per
job), the industry code, and the annual wage. The
personal characteristics data cover the entire pop-
ulation, allow linking partners in a couple, and
contain information on demographic variables
such as nationality, marital status, birth year, and
birth month.
Important for our identification strategy is a
classification of workers into treatment and con-
trol groups. We base those on industry affiliation
observed in the data. The ER window was opened
for civil servants employed by qualifying central
government organizations. We do not observe
ER window offers at individual worker level, nor
do we directly observe at which department a
civil servant worked. This implies that we cannot
observe whether a civil servant who did not retire
rejected the ER offer or simply was not offered
the ER window. Hence the “treatment” group
as defined in our data is larger than the “true”
treatment group.8
We define a baseline sample for the years
t= 2000,… , 2005. The sample selection is
guided by the qualification criteria for the reform.
The sample consists of opposite-sex couples that
were married during the entire year t.9 Further,
husbands needed to be in the treatment-relevant
age range of 55–60 (measured on December 31st
of year t), and have been continuously employed
for the 10 years prior to January 1st of year t. The
treatment group then has husbands that were cen-
tral government civil servants, the control or com-
parison group has husbands that were private sec-
tor workers. In all couples of our sample, the wife
was employed in the private sector on January 1st
of year t. Our selection ensures that husbands in
the treatment group could have been eligible for
7. The original file names are Doodsoorzaken
(2000–2005), Landelijke Medische Registratie (LMR,
1999–2004), SSB Banen (1999–2008), SSB Personen
(2000–2005) and PARTNERBUS (2010). We use vital statis-
tics to establish that a nonworking individual is not deceased.
Unfortunately, for the years we are interested in, there are no
data available on, for example, taxable financial wealth. We
do not use observations for years after 2005 because there
were some key variables such as wage income that were
measured differently after 2005.
8. We do not know how much smaller the “true” treatment
group is than the observed treatment group.
9. Being married includes having a registered partner-
ship. Registered partnership refers to partnerships enjoy-
ing legal status similar to marriage. Being married excludes
cohabitation without being married or without having a reg-
istered partnership.
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entering the ER window for civil servants, and
wives could not have been. As additional criterion
we exclude observations on workers who earned
less than 20,000 euros in the year prior to year t,
so as to ensure that workers had a strong labor
force attachment.10 Individuals with a weaker
labor force attachment may be found out of
employment, even if no formal retirement choice
is involved. We subject the data selection criteria
to a battery of sensitivity checks in Appendix B1.
We define retirement as leaving a job and
not having started working again before January
1, 2009. We use retirement of the first retir-
ing member of the couple as an absorbing state.
This implies that we do not use observations for
years after a member of the couple had retired.
By doing so, we ensure that all observations
on retirement in our sample concern transitions
into retirement rather than retirement spells that
started in previous years. We use about 100,000
observations for our analysis.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our
baseline sample, split by treatment and control
group and by treatment year (Panels a and b) and
pretreatment period (Panels c and d). The income
variables measure the total wage income the
wife and her husband earned (in year t− 1, and
expressed in tens of thousands of deflated euros).
Wage income is a relevant factor for retirement
decisions as it determines the level of pension
benefits. It is also correlated with the number of
hours worked. To capture health effects on retire-
ment with our administrative records, we include
hospitalization status information. Specifically,
we use dummy variables indicating whether the
wife or husband had been hospitalized during the
previous calendar year (t− 1). For instance, we
may pick up retirement of an individual that cares
for a sick spouse. Further, we include dummy
variables indicating whether the wife or husband
had the Dutch nationality. Nationality can pick
up immigration status and be correlated with the
number of contribution years at pension funds
and the social security system, and so with the
overall level of retirement benefits. There can
also be cultural reasons why people with dif-
ferent nationalities may make different retire-
ment decisions.
Table 1 shows that across periods (pretreat-
ment and treatment) husbands and wives are
on average very similar in terms of age, wage
10. As the annual minimum wage for full-time employ-
ment was 16,400 euros in 2005, our threshold is slightly
higher than the minimum wage for full-time employment.
income, hospitalization status, and having the
Dutch nationality. This is the case for both hus-
bands employed as civil servants and husbands
employed in the private sector. Our results of
t test indicate significant differences in means
for some characteristics, but these differences are
typically small in magnitude. For slightly more
than 20% of all our sample couples, the hus-
band was employed as a civil servant, which is
a sizeable group. Conversely, about 18% of hus-
bands married to a private-sector worker were
civil servants.
The couples in our analysis are fairly repre-
sentative for an average Dutch couple of the same
age group. Dual working couples are not uncom-
mon in the Netherlands; 78% of the men in the
age category 55–60 in the Netherlands in 2005
were married. Of them 85% were employed, and
44% of those had employed spouses. Nine per-
cent of these dual-earner couples consisted of a
husband working as a civil servant and a wife
being employed in the private sector. Civil ser-
vants represent a heterogeneous group of work-
ers, making findings based on observations for
civil servants also relevant for workers employed
in many other industries.
V. EMPIRICAL APPROACHES AND RESULTS
A. Introduction
We use a difference-in-differences approach
to first get an idea how the changed ER incen-
tives may have impacted the labor force status
of the male workers we consider. We provide
graphical evidence and discuss the parallel trend
assumption. To account for the fact that males
in the upper age range of our age bracket, the
58–60 year olds, in fact receive a stronger incen-
tive to retire early than the ones in the lower
age range (55–57), we split the treatment group
in two, allowing each to have their own aver-
age treatment effect. We then move to analyze
how the wives of males in the two treatment
groups behaved. We apply a difference-in-
differences approach with the wife’s retirement
as an outcome, measuring the effect that is often
referred to as intention-to-treat effect (ITTE).11
Results, discussed in Section V.C, give reason
to believe that wives’ retirement behavior in
particular is causally changed by the changed
retirement behavior of their spouses (husbands).
Accordingly, we are interested in measuring
11. This approach is taken by Selin (2017) for the effect
of female retirement on their husbands’ participation.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics (Baseline Sample)
Panel a Panel b
Control Group Treatment Group
Husbands Employed
in the Private Sector
Husbands Employed
as Civil Servants
Year 2005 Year 2005 Difference-in-Means
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Err. p Value
Wife’s age 53.16 4.53 53.70 4.01 −0.541 0.078 0.000
Husband’s age 57.08 1.59 57.08 1.59 0.003 0.028 0.922
Wife’s wage income [t − 1]
(in 10,000s of Euros)
3.25 1.46 3.21 1.49 0.046 0.026 0.072
Husband’s wage income
[t − 1]
(in 10,000s of Euros)
4.80 2.52 4.64 1.57 0.154 0.042 0.000
Wife hospitalized [t − 1] 0.047 0.211 0.048 0.215 −0.002 0.004 0.677
Husband hospitalized [t − 1] 0.086 0.281 0.084 0.278 0.002 0.005 0.696
Wife Dutch nationality 0.871 0.336 0.890 0.313 −0.019 0.006 0.001
Husband Dutch nationality 0.864 0.342 0.903 0.296 −0.039 0.006 0.000
Wife’s retirement 0.022 0.148 0.030 0.172 −0.008 0.003 0.002
Husband’s retirement 0.059 0.235 0.119 0.324 −0.060 0.004 0.000
N 17,880 4,012
Panel c Panel d
Husbands Employed
in the Private Sector
Husbands Employed
as Civil Servants
Years 2000–2004 Years 2000–2004 Difference-in-Means
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Err. p Value
Wife’s age 52.74 4.64 53.39 4.07 −0.644 0.044 0.000
Husband’s age 56.87 1.59 56.87 1.59 0.000 0.016 1.000
Wife’s wage income [t − 1]
(in 10,000s of Euros)
3.24 1.38 3.22 1.27 0.028 0.013 0.032
Husband’s wage income
[t − 1]
(in 10,000s of Euros)
4.86 2.49 4.66 1.52 0.200 0.023 0.000
Wife hospitalized [t − 1] 0.041 0.197 0.045 0.206 −0.004 0.002 0.045
Husband hospitalized [t − 1] 0.073 0.260 0.070 0.254 0.003 0.003 0.210
Wife Dutch nationality 0.862 0.345 0.889 0.314 −0.027 0.003 0.000
Husband Dutch nationality 0.865 0.342 0.896 0.306 −0.031 0.003 0.000
Wife’s retirement 0.025 0.157 0.024 0.152 0.002 0.002 0.271
Husband’s retirement 0.059 0.236 0.039 0.192 0.021 0.002 0.000
N 60,583 12,666
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for husband-wife couples in which the wife was employed in the private sector,
and in which the husband was aged 55–60 and was either employed as civil servant (public sector; treatment group; panels a and
c) or employed in the private sector (control group; panels b and d).Treatment year is 2005 (panels a and b).
the local average treatment effect (LATE) of
the impact of incentive-induced ER of the hus-
band on the wife’s probability to retire within 1
year. To measure this effect, we employ an IV
approach (Section V.C). We instrument the retire-
ment choice of the husband by the husband’s
eligibility for the ER window.
B. Difference-in-Difference Analysis
The difference-in-difference analysis will
relate the policy change affecting husbands
directly to the retirement status of the husband.
There are two assumptions that need to hold
for the difference-in-difference approach to be
valid: (1) treatment and control groups need to
have experienced parallel trends in absence of
treatment, and (2) there are no strong composi-
tional changes between before and after reform
measurements that affect groups differentially.
Regarding the second assumption, we found
no sizeable differences in observables before and
after the reform for the control and treatment
group in Section IV. This finding gives us rea-
son to believe that there were no strong compo-
sitional changes in unobservables that may bias
our results later on. Also, the eligibility criteria
BLOEMEN, HOCHGUERTEL & ZWEERINK: COORDINATION OF SPOUSAL RETIREMENT DECISIONS 917
FIGURE 1
Husbands’ Retirement Rates by Year and Sector (Percentages)
Notes: This figure shows average 12-months-ahead retirement rates for husbands, by husbands’ sector of employment.
Based on the baseline sample (Table 1).
for the ER window, in particular the criterion on
continuous employment in the public sector dur-
ing the prior 10 years, made sure that the reform
did not trigger selection into the treatment group.
The first assumption can be checked graphi-
cally and tested formally. Figure 1 shows retire-
ment rates for husbands in the age category
55–60 across years. There is a clear upwards
jump of about 8 percentage points visible in 2005
for the treatment group, although there is no dif-
ferential behavior between the control and treat-
ment group during the pretreatment years. We
employ a basic difference-in-difference model
without covariates to formally verify the parallel
trend assumption:
Hit = αH +
j=2004∑
j=2000




γjH ι (t = j)CitH
+ γ2005,H ι (t = 2005)CitH
+ ζHCitH + vit,
where Hit is a dummy variable that is 1 if the
husband of couple i retired in year t, Hit is 0
otherwise,12 ι(.) is the indicator function, CitH is
a dummy variable indicating whether the hus-
band was employed as a civil servant in year t,
and 0 otherwise (employed in the private sec-
tor).13 Pretreatment year 2004 serves as the base-
line year for the interactions between the dum-
mies for year and husband being employed as
a civil servant. Under the parallel trend assump-
tion, the treatment and control group should not
display pronounced differential time patterns in
absence of treatment. Table 2 shows that the coef-
ficients on the interactions of dummies for year
and the husband being employed as a civil ser-
vant are not significant for the pretreatment years
2000–2003. This suggests that the parallel trend
assumption holds as far as the pretreatment years
are concerned.
Adding a vector of covariates zit as displayed
in Table 1 and dummy variables for the wife’s
12. Recall that we treat retirement of the first retiring
member of the couple as an absorbing state. Hence, Hit can
only be 1 if the husband retired before the wife.
13. The parameters are αH (intercept), βjH (year fixed
effects), γjH(year j times employed as a civil servant), and vit
is an error term.
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TABLE 2
Husband’s Probability to Retire: Testing the
Common Trend Assumption




Year 2000 −0.0023 0.0032 0.480
Year 2001 0.0032 0.0030 0.288
Year 2002 0.0096 0.0028 0.001
Year 2003 −0.0045 0.0026 0.080
Year 2004 −0.0023 0.0025 0.370













Constant 0.0589 0.0018 0.000
N 95,141
Notes: This table shows OLS estimates of a linear prob-
ability model of husband’s retirement status within 1 year
(12 months). There are no other regressors. Estimates are
based on the baseline sample (Table 1). Treatment group:
Husband civil servant; treatment year: 2005. Standard errors
are robust to heteroscedasticity.
age AkitW (taking the value 1 if the wife’s age in
year t is equal to k), and removing dummy inter-
actions of pretreatment years with the husband
being employed as a civil servant, we perform a
difference-in-difference analysis with a treatment
group that is homogeneous in age (55–60):
Hit = αH +
j=2004∑
j=2000
βjH ι (t = j)(2)




χkWAkitW + z′itφW + vit.
The coefficient of interest, γ2005, H , measur-
ing the interaction of year 2005 and the treat-
ment group, has a point estimate of 9 percentage
points and is highly significant. Table 3 reports
full results on the exercise.
C. Intention-to-Treat Estimates
We perform a similar difference-in-difference
analysis for wife’s retirement status to study the
spillovers of husbands’ induced retirement on
their wives’ retirement behavior.
We again start with discussing whether the
parallel trend assumption (1) and the assumption
on the absence of compositional changes (2) hold.
Figure 2 shows that prereform trends in wife’s
retirement rates were parallel for the control and
treatment group. Wife’s retirement rates show a
jump of about 1 percentage point in 2005 for the
treatment group. We also formally verify the par-
allel trend assumption by estimating Equation (1)
with the wife’s retirement status as the dependent
variable. Table 4 shows that none of the coeffi-
cients on the interactions of the dummies for the
pretreatment years 2000–2003 and the husband
being employed as a civil servant are significant.
Concerning the second assumption, we dis-
cussed in Section IV that there were no large dif-
ferences in observables between the control and
treatment group before and after the reform. We
also have no reason to believe that such differ-
ences in unobservables exist.
Spillover effects of husbands’ retirement
incentives on their wives’ retirement behav-
ior can be captured through specifying the
following equation:
Wit = αW +
j=2004∑
j=2000
βjW ι (t = j)(3)




χkWAkitW + z′itφW + uit,
where Wit is a dummy variable that is 1 if the wife
in couple i retired in year t and 0 otherwise, and
uit is the error term. All other (year) variables are
as specified above for Equation (2). Coefficient
γ2005, W in particular, measures the ITTE, that is,
the spillover effect of the policy change (directly
affecting the husband) on the retirement behavior
of the wife.
Table 5 shows results. The ITTE coeffi-
cient estimate indicates that the policy change
increased the probability of wives’ retirement
whose husbands were employed as civil servants
by 1 percentage point. The effect is significant
at the 5% level, but it is an order of magnitude
smaller than the effect for husbands.
Further refinement by splitting the treatment
group in two (ages 55–57 vs. 58–60) is moti-
vated by the greater strength of the retirement
incentive for older ages. Figure 3 shows that hus-
band’s retirement rates for the two subgroups
display very different behavior. The upper age
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TABLE 3
Husband’s Probability to Retire: Difference-in-Difference Estimates
Coefficient Std. Err. p Value
Husband civil servant×Year 2005 0.0879 0.0069 0.000
Wife’s wage income [t − 1] (in 10,000s of Euros) 0.0009 0.0006 0.104
Husband’s wage income [t − 1] (in 10,000s of Euros) −0.0026 0.0003 0.000
Wife hospitalized [t − 1] −0.0002 0.0039 0.949
Husband hospitalized [t − 1] 0.0105 0.0031 0.001
Wife Dutch nationality 0.0023 0.0023 0.321
Husband Dutch nationality 0.0002 0.0023 0.923
Wife’s age dummies Yes
Year dummies Yes
Husband civil servant −0.0211 0.0020 0.000
Constant 0.1284 0.0414 0.002
N 95,141
Notes: This table shows OLS estimates of a linear probability model of husband’s retirement status within 1 year (12 months).
Estimates are based on the baseline sample (Table 1). Treatment group: Husband civil servant; treatment year: 2005. Standard
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.
FIGURE 2
Wives’ Retirement Rates by Year and Sector (Percentages)
Notes: This figure shows average 12-months-ahead retirement rates for wives, by husbands’ sector of employment. Based
on the baseline sample (Table 1).
group shows a jump of about 16% and the lower
age group a jump of about 3% (the total effect
is a weighted average with the lower age group
being more populous). We skip displaying and
discussing estimation results corresponding to
Equation (2) for this refinement (the results can
be obtained on request and are fully in line with
Figure 3), and instead focus directly on the exten-
sion of Equation (3), modeling retirement deci-
sions of the wife.
Table 6 shows that if we split the treatment
group in two (55–57 and 58–60), the ITTE coef-
ficient estimate for wives is not significant for
the treatment group having husbands in the age
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TABLE 4
Wife’s Probability to Retire: Testing the
Common Trend Assumption




Year 2000 0.0093 0.0016 0.000
Year 2001 −0.0004 0.0012 0.736
Year 2002 0.0027 0.0011 0.014
Year 2003 0.0022 0.0010 0.027
Year 2004 0.0030 0.0009 0.001













Constant 0.0223 0.0147 0.130
N 95,141
Notes: This table shows OLS estimates of a linear prob-
ability model of wife’s retirement status within 1 year
(12 months). There are no other regressors. Estimates are
based on the baseline sample (Table 1). Treatment group:
Husband civil servant; treatment year: 2005. Standard errors
are robust to heteroscedasticity.
category 55–57; the estimate is a noticeable and
significant 2 percentage points for the treatment
group with husbands in the age category 58–60.
As before, the control group consists of wives
with husbands employed in the private sector and
in the age category 55–60.
D. Instrumental Variable Analysis
Given that husbands and wives can retire
from the labor market at virtually any age and
year, for a large variety of reasons (ranging
from income effects to health considerations),
the interesting question we want to answer is
now how much of an effect in wives’ ER can
be causally ascribed to the changed-incentive-
induced ER of husbands (LATE)? We apply an IV
approach (two stage least squares), instrument-
ing the husband’s retirement status with his treat-
ment group membership (civil servant) interacted
with age dummies and treatment year 2005. So
the first stage is a refinement of the difference-
in-difference analysis where we used two eligible
age groups. In the second stage, the impact of
predicted retirement of the husband on the wife’s
probability to retire within 12 months is esti-
mated. The reduced form corresponds to a (fur-
ther refined) difference-in-differences analysis
TABLE 5
Wife’s Probability to Retire: Intention-to-Treat
Effect










(in 10,000s of Euros)
0.0010 0.0002 0.000








Wife’s age dummies Yes
Year dummies Yes
Husband civil servant −0.0023 0.0015 0.115
Constant 0.0134 0.0136 0.323
N 95,141
Notes: This table shows OLS estimates of a linear prob-
ability model of wife’s retirement status within 1 year
(12 months). Estimates are based on the baseline sample
(Table 1). Treatment group: Husband civil servant; treatment
year: 2005. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.
for the wife’s retirement. As the analysis (Section
V.C, Table 6) showed, there is strong evidence
for causal spillover effects of retirement status
between spouses, and there is reason to assume
that treatment effects are heterogeneous across
age groups. The finer-grained split of age groups
can help us understand who, within the treatment
group, is affected by how much.
We specify the first stage of our model
as follows:
Hit = αH +
j=2004∑
j=2000














κlH ι (t = 2005)
× AlitHCitH + z′itφH + vit.
The specification is a generalization of
Equation (2) that formed the basis for our
difference-in-difference analysis, now control-
ling for age-specific treatment effects, spousal
ages, and additional regressors. Equation (2′)
BLOEMEN, HOCHGUERTEL & ZWEERINK: COORDINATION OF SPOUSAL RETIREMENT DECISIONS 921
FIGURE 3
Husbands’ Retirement Rates by Year and Sector (Civil Servants; Percentages)
Notes: This figure shows average 12-months-ahead retirement rates for husbands employed as civil servants, by husbands’
age group. Selected from the baseline sample (Table 1, panels b and d).
contains, subsequently, year dummies, cross
effects year dummies, and civil servants, wife’s
age dummies, husband’s age dummies, cross
effects of husband’s age dummies and civil
servants, the instruments, that is, age-specific
treatment effects (for civil servants in 2005), and
additional covariates.
The second stage is specified as follows:
Wit = αW +
j=2004∑
j=2000











+ z′itφW + ωĤit + uit.
Again, the equation is similar to Equation
(3), except that the impact of the policy vari-
ables is not directly incorporated but will be
reflected through the husband’s predicted retire-
ment choice. ω, the coefficient on the predicted
retirement indicator of the husband, indicates the
LATE. uit and vit are allowed to be correlated with
each other.
Instrument Validity. The validity of our instru-
ments hinges on the satisfaction of two condi-
tions. First, the instruments have an impact on
the probability that husbands retire. Second, the
instruments do not correlate with unobserved fac-
tors having an impact on the probability that
wives retire.
Figure 4 shows retirement rates for different
birth cohorts by age for husbands who were
employed as civil servants. As we saw before in
Figures 1 and 3, husbands had higher retirement
rates in 2005 than in earlier years. The differ-
ence in retirement rates between 2005 and earlier
years varies by age and was especially large for
husbands in the upper age category 58–60, con-
siderably smaller for husbands aged 57, and even
smaller for husbands aged 55–56. This is all in
line with the age-specific incentives as provided
by the temporary decrease in eligibility age in ER
benefits, as discussed in Section III. This supports
our hypothesis that our instruments are relevant.
To our knowledge, there were in 2005 no sim-
ilar ER windows in sectors other than the public
sector. We thus do not expect the opening of the
ER window to have had a direct impact on the
probability that the wives retired. In Appendix
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TABLE 6
Wife’s Probability to Retire, Heterogeneous
Intention-to-Treat Effect















(in 10,000s of Euros)
0.0010 0.0002 0.000








Wife’s age dummies Yes










Constant 0.0112 0.0135 0.406
N 95,141
Notes: This table shows OLS estimates of a linear
probability model of wife’s retirement status within 1-year
(12 months). Estimates are based on the baseline sample
(Table 1). Treatment group: Husband civil servant in the age
category 55–60; treatment year: 2005. Standard errors are
robust to heteroscedasticity.
B2, we perform a robustness check using placebo
instruments for the eligibility of private sector
workers. We are also not aware of any event other
than the opening of the ER window that may
have affected the probability to retire for civil ser-
vants in 2005. We expect that our instruments
are not correlated with unobserved factors that
influenced the wives’ probability to retire. Wives’
unobserved health, number of hours worked, or
stress levels associated with work are among
the unobserved factors that may have influenced
wives’ probability to retire. These factors may
be affected if retirement of the husband could
have been anticipated. Correlation due to antic-
ipation is not expected to be an issue. This is
because the opening of the ER window was
only announced by the government in April 2004
and central government employers only decided
within the next 8–9 months whether and to whom
they would actually open the ER window. Selec-
tion into public sector jobs after the announce-
ment of the policy change is not an issue either,
because eligibility was tied to career qualifica-
tions described earlier.
Results for the Uninstrumented Case. For com-
parison, we first estimate by ordinary least
squares (OLS) the model as specified in (3′)
without correcting for potential endogeneity
of husband’s retirement, so with husband’s
retirement status rather than husband’s predicted
retirement status as the key regressor. Table 7
shows that the coefficient estimate of husband’s
actual retirement status on the wife’s retirement
is (less than) 1 percentage point and significant
at the 5% level. This effect is similar in size to
the ITTE.
Instrumental Variable Estimates. Table 8 shows
the IV estimate. The coefficient estimate on
retirement of the husband indicates that retire-
ment of husbands induced by the opening of the
ER window actually increased their wives’ prob-
ability to retire within 1 year by 10 percentage
points. This effect is significant at the 5% level.
Interestingly, the coefficient estimate on retire-
ment of the husband is larger than it was in
the uninstrumented case. One explanation for the
LATE being larger is that those likely to respond
to the policy were those who had wives who
would retire with them. It may also be that the
difference in coefficient estimates is due to endo-
geneity bias in the uninstrumented case.14 The
F-statistic in the first stage shows that our instru-
ments are jointly significant at the 1% level. The
LATE is considerably larger than the ITTE dis-
cussed above, as can be expected since not all
treated husbands actually do retire. The LATE
estimate is of a similar magnitude as the effect
found by Banks, Blundell, and Casanova Rivas
(2010). They find a positive effect of 14–20 per-
centage points of incentive-induced retirement
of the husband on wives’ probability to retire
within 2-year time intervals for husbands that are
between zero and 2 years older than their wives.
We should point out at this stage that the
finding of a 10 percentage point is fully robust to
alternative identification strategies and changes
in the specification of the conditional mean
14. The coefficient on retirement status of the husband
can be biased in both directions through many different mech-
anisms. This also makes it difficult to indicate which mecha-
nism or mechanisms made the coefficient biased downwards
rather than upwards.
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FIGURE 4
Husbands’ Retirement Rates by Age and Year of Birth (Civil Servants; Percentages)
Notes: This figure shows average 12-months-ahead retirement rates for husbands employed as civil servants, by husbands’
birth cohort. Selected from the baseline sample (Table 1, panels b and d). 2005 minus husbands’ year of birth indicates husbands’
age in treatment year 2005.
function. In Appendix B1, we use workers
employed as civil servants and in the (ineligible)
age category 52–54 in 2005 as an alternative
control group. We use two samples, one with
observations on wives with husbands employed
as civil servants only, and another one also
including observations on wives with husbands
employed in the private sector. We arrive at very
similar point estimates for the causal effect. Fur-
ther changes in the functional form specification
are investigated in Appendix B3.
Reduced Form Estimates. The coefficient esti-
mates on the instruments in the reduced form
model can show us how old the husbands are
that drive the effect of incentive-induced hus-
band’s retirement on the wife’s probability to
retire within 1 year. The reduced form of model
(3′) (resulting from inserting (2′) in (3′)) actually
is a refined variant of the difference-in-difference
specification (3), with separate treatment coeffi-
cients for each eligible age. Table 9 shows the
reduced form estimates. In the earlier analysis
based on (3), with all eligible ages pooled, we
found a positive and significant effect of treat-
ment (Table 5). The further refinement (Table 9)
shows that the treatment coefficients of each
TABLE 7




Coefficient Std. Err. p Value
Retirement status husband 0.0117 0.0028 0.000
Wife’s wage income
[t − 1]




(in 10,000s of Euros)
0.0010 0.0002 0.000








Wife’s age dummies Yes






Constant 0.0106 0.0137 0.439
N 95,141
Notes: This table shows OLS estimates of a linear prob-
ability model of wife’s retirement status within 1 year
(12 months), as function of the observed retirement status
of the husband. Estimates are based on the baseline sample
(Table 1). Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.
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TABLE 8
Wife’s Probability to Retire (Instrumental Variables)





Coefficient Std. Err. p Value Coefficient Std. Err. p Value
Predicted retirement status husband 0.1042 0.0372 0.005
Instruments (6x)
Husband’s age 55×Husband civil servant×Year 2005 0.0102 0.0072 0.156
Husband’s age 56×Husband civil servant×Year 2005 0.0325 0.0078 0.000
Husband’s age 57×Husband civil servant×Year 2005 0.0609 0.0111 0.000
Husband’s age 58×Husband civil servant×Year 2005 0.1537 0.0164 0.000
Husband’s age 59×Husband civil servant×Year 2005 0.1719 0.0177 0.000
Husband’s age 60×Husband civil servant×Year 2005 0.1386 0.0268 0.000
Wife’s wage income [t − 1] (in 10,000s of Euros) 0.0009 0.0006 0.099 −0.0010 0.0004 0.029
Husband’s wage income [t − 1] (in 10,000s of Euros) −0.0026 0.0003 0.000 0.0013 0.0003 0.000
Wife hospitalized [t − 1] −0.0003 0.0039 0.930 0.0119 0.0032 0.000
Husband hospitalized [t − 1] 0.0105 0.0031 0.001 0.0002 0.0020 0.906
Wife Dutch nationality 0.0023 0.0023 0.321 −0.0035 0.0016 0.028
Husband Dutch nationality 0.0002 0.0023 0.915 −0.0042 0.0016 0.008
Wife’s and husband’s age dummies, year dummies Yes Yes
Husband’s age dummies×Husband civil servant Yes Yes
Constant 0.1245 0.0414 0.003 −0.0024 0.0150 0.874
F statistic instruments 40.16
N 95,141
Notes: This table shows 2SLS estimates of a linear probability model of wife’s retirement status within 1 year (12 months), as
function of the predicted retirement status of the husband. Estimates are based on the baseline sample (Table 1). Standard errors
are robust to heteroscedasticity.
TABLE 9
Wife’s Probability to Retire (Reduced Form)
Coefficient Std. Err. p Value
Instruments (6x)
Husband’s age 55×Husband civil servant×Year 2005 0.0006 0.0042 0.877
Husband’s age 56×Husband civil servant×Year 2005 0.0097 0.0053 0.067
Husband’s age 57×Husband civil servant×Year 2005 0.0055 0.0063 0.386
Husband’s age 58×Husband civil servant×Year 2005 0.0040 0.0074 0.592
Husband’s age 59×Husband civil servant×Year 2005 0.0149 0.0098 0.130
Husband’s age 60×Husband civil servant×Year 2005 0.0465 0.0174 0.007
Wife’s wage income [t − 1] (in 10,000s of Euros) −0.0009 0.0004 0.045
Husband’s wage income [t − 1] (in 10,000s of Euros) 0.0010 0.0002 0.000
Wife hospitalized [t − 1] 0.0118 0.0032 0.000
Husband hospitalized [t − 1] 0.0013 0.0019 0.499
Wife Dutch nationality −0.0033 0.0016 0.039
Husband Dutch nationality −0.0042 0.0016 0.008
Wife’s and husband’s age dummies, year dummies Yes
Husband’s age dummies×Husband civil servant Yes
Constant 0.0102 0.0135 0.452
F statistic instruments 2.18
N 95,141
Notes: This table shows OLS estimates of a linear probability model of wife’s retirement status within 1 year (12 months), as
function of the instruments. Estimates are based on the baseline sample (Table 1). Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.
eligible age separately are not all individually sig-
nificant at the 5% level. The coefficient on hus-
band’s age 60 interacted with the dummy for the
year 2005 is the only one that is positive and
significant, indicating that the effect of interest
is driven by wives with husbands aged 60. As
husbands were typically older than or as old as
their wives, husbands aged 60 have on average
the highest likelihood of having wives aged 60.
In the observation period, the age of 60 was a
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TABLE 10
Wife’s Probability to Retire (Alternative Reduced Form)
Coefficient Std. Err. p Value
Selected coefficients
Wife’s age 55×Husband civil servant×Year 2005 0.0110 0.0079 0.162
Wife’s age 56×Husband civil servant×Year 2005 0.0024 0.0074 0.747
Wife’s age 57×Husband civil servant×Year 2005 0.0101 0.0102 0.324
Wife’s age 58×Husband civil servant×Year 2005 0.0150 0.0152 0.323
Wife’s age 59×Husband civil servant×Year 2005 0.0336 0.0202 0.097
Wife’s age 60×Husband civil servant×Year 2005 0.1437 0.0543 0.008
Wife’s age 61×Husband civil servant×Year 2005 −0.0255 0.0773 0.742
Wife’s age 62×Husband civil servant×Year 2005 0.1805 0.1422 0.204
Wife’s age 63×Husband civil servant×Year 2005 0.3545 0.3522 0.314
Wife’s age dummies×Husband civil servant×Year 2005 Yes
Wife’s wage income [t − 1] (in 10,000s of Euros) −0.0009 0.0004 0.045
Husband’s wage income [t − 1] (in 10,000s of Euros) 0.0010 0.0002 0.000
Wife hospitalized [t − 1] 0.0118 0.0032 0.000
Husband hospitalized [t − 1] 0.0012 0.0019 0.543
Wife Dutch nationality −0.0033 0.0016 0.038
Husband Dutch nationality −0.0042 0.0016 0.009
Wife’s and husband’s age dummies, year dummies Yes
Husband’s age dummies×Husband civil servant Yes
Constant −0.0026 0.0028 0.358
N 95,141
Note: This table shows OLS estimates of a linear probability model of wife’s retirement status within 1 year (12 months),
as function of (interactions of) public/private sector group indicators and wife’s age indicators and treatment year indicators.
Estimates are based on the baseline sample (Table 1). Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.
common age of eligibility for ER in many private
sector ER arrangements. This is for us a reason
to verify whether the effect of retirement of hus-
bands on retirement status of wives runs through
husbands with wives aged 60.
Table 10 shows the coefficient estimates of a
linear regression model with wife’s retirement
status as the dependent variable and wife’s age
dummies interacted with the dummy for the year
2005.15 The coefficients on all of those interac-
tion terms are insignificant, except the one for the
interactions between age 60 and year 2005. That
coefficient is large and positive. This indicates
that wives aged 60 in 2005 had a much larger
probability to retire within 1 year than wives
aged 60 in earlier years. Banks, Blundell, and
Casanova Rivas (2010) also find such an interac-
tion effect of retirement incentives.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We identify and estimate the causal effect
of the husband’s retirement status on the
wife’s retirement rate by using a quasi-natural
15. Also included in the regressor set are wife’s age
dummies, husband’s age dummies, husband’s age dummies
interacted with the dummy for the husband being employed
as a civil servant, year dummies, and wife’s and husband’s
personal characteristics.
experiment where policy variation induces the
husband to retire early. We focus on couples
where only the male, but not the female, was
subject to specific ER incentives applicable to
civil servants, and both spouses had a strong
labor market attachment.
We benefit from having administrative data
from the Netherlands and having a strong and
exogenous source of variation in retirement
status of the husband at our disposal. We find
that incentive-induced retirement of husbands
increases the probability that the wife retires
within 12 months by 10 percentage points. The
finding indicates that the temporary decrease of
the eligibility age for ER benefits for male civil
servants has a strong (indirect, but nearly imme-
diate) effect on retirement status of their spouse.
Our result is robust to changes in functional form
specification, and in general robust to changes
in data selection criteria as well. It is also robust
to employing alternative identification strategies
(identifying assumptions and definition of con-
trol groups). All in all, we believe that leisure
complementarities in preferences are consistent
with the pattern documented here. However, we
find a strong effect coming from a precisely char-
acterized group, namely husbands aged 60 with
wives aged 60. As age 60 was the eligibility age
for regular ER benefits in many sectors, our result
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suggests that retirement of husbands induced by
the opening of the ER window may have caused
wives to retire using regular ER benefits. Alter-
natively, husbands with wives aged 60 may have
been more likely to accept the ER offer than
husbands with wives of other ages. Such interac-
tion effects of the ER window under review and
regular ER arrangements in other sectors would
be consistent with the evidence for interaction
effects for ER arrangements for spouses provided
by Banks, Blundell, and Casanova Rivas (2010).
Reforms are ubiquitous in retirement sys-
tems around the world, and there is much
experimentation with policy parameters,
sometimes instigated by idiosyncratic ad-hoc
decisions. The reform we study is no exception,
as it advanced retirement entry age in a world
characterized by tightening qualification or abo-
lition of ER. We may speculatively conclude
that many policy initiatives that postpone final
labor market withdrawal likewise may have a
double impact—not only on the workers directly
affected, but indirectly by way of delaying
retirement of their spouses.
APPENDIX A: INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS
A1. THE DUTCH PENSION AND RETIREMENT
SYSTEM
The Dutch pension system rests on three pillars (Boven-
berg and Meijdam 2001).16 The first pillar is the public old-
age pension system (social security), financed on a pay-as-
you-go basis. Contributions stem from workers and employ-
ers. All residents registered in the Netherlands accrue pub-
lic old-age pension rights. Public old-age pension benefits
are flat. For couples they equal the minimum wage. Singles
receive 70% of the minimum wage. For every year between
the ages 15 and 65 that an individual does not reside in the
Netherlands, public old-age benefits are cut by 2 percent-
age points. The second pillar consists of occupational pen-
sions (including company-specific funds of large firms, and
industry-wide funds covering all occupations in an industry).
These are funded pensions, typically of the defined benefit
type, and generally managed on the sector (or firm) level.
The third pillar consists of private provisions. Those include,
among others, annuities or life insurance policies.
About 90% of all employees participate in an occupa-
tional pension plan. Occupational pension schemes receive
contributions from workers and employers. Workers who par-
ticipate in a pension plan pay contributions over the difference
between their wage and a nominal threshold called the “fran-
chise.” The franchise is about 143% of the public-old age pen-
sion benefit level. In this way, first-pillar old age pensions and
second-pillar occupational pensions are integrated and jointly
achieve before-tax replacement rates of 70%. As every sector
has its own pension plan and pension conditions, there is a
large heterogeneity among occupational pensions.
16. See also Bloemen, Hochguertel, and Zweerink
(2017).
A2. REGULAR EARLY RETIREMENT
ARRANGEMENTS FOR PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS
For the time period studied, early retirement (ER) pen-
sions, embedded in the occupational pension system, were
widespread, owing to tax incentives.17 There was an accord-
ingly large heterogeneity in ER arrangements across sectors.
The ER eligibility age generally varied from age 60 to 62.
Workers and employers contributed to both parts of the ER
benefit scheme via a separate pay-as-you-go system. Gross
(before-tax) benefits corresponded to 70% of the preretire-
ment average salary level. Retiring through the ER system
had no effect on regular pension benefits (for which eligibility
started at age 65).
A3. REGULAR EARLY RETIREMENT
ARRANGEMENTS FOR CIVIL SERVANTS
The public sector had its own ER system, which shared
many features with the private sector schemes, however. As
of April 1, 1997, ER benefits for civil servants consisted
of two parts. The first part was financed on a pay-as-you-go
basis and was in general 70% of the franchise for civil servants
who had worked full-time during their working life.18 The
second part was funded and complemented the first part to
a sum of up to 70% of workers’ average pay (mid-career
salary). Workers and employers contributed to both parts of
the ER benefit scheme. The first part intended to compensate
early retirees for the lack of old-age pension benefits for the
period between ER and normal retirement. Civil servants were
eligible for the first part if they satisfied two conditions. First,
they had to have been employed as civil servants continuously
during the 10 years prior to ER. Second, they had to have
contributed continuously to the public pension fund during
the 10 years preceding ER. The first part of ER benefits was
in general higher when a civil servant retired at a later age. ER
among civil servants usually occurred at age 61 or 62.
Pensions achieving the maximum replacement rate
required a contribution history of 40 years. The replace-
ment rate was reduced by 1.75 percentage points for every
year that the total pension contribution period fell short of
40 years. Civil servants were allowed to do paid work after
ER. However, total income of a retired civil servant was not
allowed to exceed 100% of the average pay. Otherwise, ER
benefits were cut to bring the total income earned to 100% of
the average gross wage (means test).
A4. THE 2005 ER WINDOW
Following announcement in April 2004, departments
(ministries) could offer their qualifying employees the pos-
sibility to retire as early as of age 55 during the months
of January through November 2005. The benefit duration was
capped at 8 years, however. Qualification entailed meeting
17. The so-called fiscal facilitation of the early retirement
contributions implied that the early retirement benefits were
taxed, and that the early retirement contributions paid by
workers and employers were exempted from taxation. As
effectively less tax was paid, the fiscal facilitation made
early retirement very attractive for both eligible workers and
employers.
18. This replacement rate is based on retirement at the ER
eligibility age.
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TABLE B1
Robustness Checks on Data Selection (IV Estimates)
Variation LATE Std. Err. p Value F Stat. N
Baseline (Table 8) 0.1042 0.0372 0.005 40.16 95,141
a. Sample without restricting wage income [t − 1] 0.0286 0.0309 0.354 86.03 246,351
b. Sample incl. husbands aged 52–60 0.0983 0.0365 0.007 41.84 170,619
c. Sample incl. husbands aged 52–60, civil servants only 0.0904 0.0394 0.022 42.60 30,344
Note: See Table 8 for estimator, specification, and baseline sample. Variations alter, one by one, the data selection criteria.
the 10-year employment and contribution rules that applied
to regular ER arrangements as well.
We exemplify the different incentives operating for civil
servants at different ages in 2005. Those, say, born in January
1950, who just turned 55 and retired in January 2005, would
see their ER benefits expire in January 2013 at the age of
63. They would then need to bridge another 2 years without
benefits, before becoming eligible for regular pension benefits
in January 2015 again. Those born in January 1948, who
turned 57 in January 2005, could have retired on the special
ER scheme and continued on regular pension benefits, not
facing a coverage gap. Those born before January 1948 could
in addition continue accruing regular pension claims at a rate
of 50% at their employer’s expense for up to 4 years.
A5. OTHER POLICY CHANGES
On January 1, 2004, the public sector pension fund
switched from a final pay pension regime to an average pay
pension regime. Owing to a transitional arrangement, civil
servants born before January 1, 1954 were hardly affected
by this switch.
On January 1, 2006, the so-called fiscal facilitation of
ER benefits for individuals born on January 1, 1950 or later
was terminated. This implied that most ER arrangements for
the youngest workers in our sample disappeared. The factual
abolition of ER arrangements may have induced the affected
workers to retire later. The termination of the fiscal facilitation
of ER benefits could have been anticipated as of 2003 and may
have induced anticipation effects of civil servants aged 53–55
in 2005.
A6. EARLY RETIREMENT VIA DI
Workers may alternatively effectuate an early withdrawal
from the labor force by starting to receive DI benefits. Workers
could start receiving DI benefits if they would be judged
to be disabled by a medical examiner of the social insurance
institute. DI benefits amounted to up to 70% of the final pay.
The DI system was financed by workers and employers. In
the context of this paper, it is important to notice that civil
servants faced the same generosity of and eligibility criteria
for DI benefits as workers employed in other sectors. Hence,
program substitution effects will not explain our findings.
There were also no major changes in DI in 2005 that
could potentially explain our findings. There was one change
in DI implemented on December 29, 2005. From that day
on, eligibility criteria for starting to receive disability benefits
have been tightened and disability benefits have been made
less generous for workers who were only partially disabled.
One year earlier, another change in DI had taken place.
Since January 1, 2004, workers could only start receiving DI
benefits after having been on continuous sick leave for 2 years.
We hardly observe any civil servants who were induced to
retire in 2005 and who started receiving disability benefits
soon after retirement. Moreover, the inflow into DI for men in
all ages decreased smoothly from 53,000 in 2001 to 36,000 in
2004 and dropped to 17,000 in 2005. It is thus unlikely that the
retirement rates in 2005 were boosted by changed incentives
in DI (Statistics Netherlands 2006).
APPENDIX B: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
B1. ROBUSTNESS CHECK ON DATA SELECTION
B.1.1 No selection on wage income
We selected observations on workers who had a lagged
wage income of at least 20,000 euros. Not having recourse
to information on hours worked, we did so to make sure that
husbands and wives in our sample had a strong labor force
attachment. Workers with a weak labor force attachment may
not have performed career planning and may not have planned
or coordinated retirement with their spouses. Also, workers
with low wage income and low hours worked may have
had much leisure time already, so leisure complementarities
may have been less of a motivation for them to coordinate
retirement. We may therefore not expect an effect for this
group of workers. Table B1 shows that the LATE estimate is
indeed not significant if observations on workers with a wage
income (at t − 1) of any level are included (variation a). Note
that the first stage continues to be strong (F-test), meaning
that husbands were kept being induced to retire. Hence, we
interpret this as evidence for the hypothesis that women with
a stronger labor force attachment were indeed more likely to
coordinate retirement with their spouses.
B.1.2 Alternative identification strategies (control groups)
Our baseline sample has couples in which husbands are
in the age category 55–60 only. Alternatively, we can add
observations on couples in which husbands were in the age
category 52–54 (and working in either sector) to the sample.
Note that all of the added husbands were in the control
group (the added public sector workers were ineligible for the
ER window).
The reason for this alternative setup is that not only the
nature of labor contracts (including employment protection)
differs substantially between private and public sectors, but
also ER arrangements, while similar, differ across sectors in
many details. So, there may be unobservable, but relevant
differences between the treatment and control group that our
baseline specification fails to pick up. The disadvantage of the
present alternative identification strategy is that workers in the
control group are not necessarily in the same age category as
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those in the treatment group (the younger ones in fact have
very low retirement rates).
We find, however, that the LATE estimated using the alter-
native model (variation b) is similar to the LATE estimated
using the baseline model.
We can even go a step further and drop observations on
couples in which husbands were employed in the private
sector. The advantage of this approach is that results are not
affected by possibly unnoticed developments in retirement
rates in the private sector. Identification relies therefore on age
in 2005.
The LATE estimated using the alternative model is, how-
ever, again similar to our baseline LATE (variation c). Both
these two alternative identification strategies, in conjunction
with the baseline result, therefore provide reliable evidence
for the validity of our approach and robustness of our finding.
B2. PLACEBO INSTRUMENTS
We further verify whether the variation in retirement rates
of husbands in the age category 55–60 in 2005 could have
been due to another event that occurred in 2005 and may have
affected the private sector workers as well.
We deviate from the baseline by choosing as instruments
dummies for the husband’s age (55–60) interacted with a
dummy for the year 2005 interacted with a dummy for the
husband being employed in the private sector. We also include
an interaction of dummies for the year 2005 and the husband
being employed as a civil servant to absorb the effect of the
treatment received by civil servants.
Table B2 shows that there is no effect of placebo
incentive-induced retirement of the husband on retirement
status of the wife. The first stage coefficient estimates on the
instruments show that the interaction of husband’s age 55
with the year 2005 dummy and the husband being employed
in the private sector dummy is the only instrument that
significantly affects retirement status of the husband. That
coefficient is only small in size. This suggests that the jumps
in retirement rates for husbands employed as civil servants
are induced by the opening of the ER window rather than
a 2005 macro shock that shifted the retirement rates of all
employed husbands upwards.
B3. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON THE MODEL
SPECIFICATION
B.3.1 Wife’s retirement horizon
Our baseline IV model uses wife’s retirement within
12 months as the dependent variable in the second stage. How-
ever, our results may be sensitive to the time horizon for which
we measure wife’s retirement. The wife’s reaction to the deci-
sion of her husband may be somewhat delayed, for instance,
for many reasons. Table B3 shows that the LATE estimate is
similar to the baseline estimate if we use wife’s retirement
within 24 months as the dependent variable (variation a). This
indicates that the effect of induced husband’s retirement on
wife’s retirement is rather immediate and concentrated on
wife’s retirement within 12 months. The proximity in time
of the spousal retirement decisions bolsters the hypothesis of
leisure complementarities that may be at work even for indi-
viduals with a strong labor market attachment.
B.3.2 Industry dummies
Husbands and wives employed in the private sector are
heterogeneous groups of workers, possibly more so than in the
public sector. Our baseline specification does not control
for the heterogeneity of retirement rates across industries.
Adding industry dummies for both wives and husbands does
not affect our results, however (variation b).19
B.3.3 Exclusion of wage income and hospitalization
Table 1 suggested that there are small but occasionally
significant differences across treatment/control groups for
some of the regressor means. It may therefore be important to
control for those regressors explicitly, as we do in the baseline.
In Table 8, the associated coefficients were small but some
of them were statistically significant. However, the LATE
estimate for the model excluding wage income (at t − 1) of
the wife and husband (variation c) is almost identical to the
baseline. The same is true when we exclude hospitalization (at
t − 1) of the wife and husband (variation d). This shows that
our LATE is robust to excluding some of the control variables
that may be deemed important on a priori grounds. Those, at
least, do not cause (additional) omitted variable bias.
B.3.4 Age polynomial, age group dummies
Our statements concerning the probability to retire are
to be understood conditional on wife’s and husband’s age.
Clearly, individual age is an important determinant of one’s
own retirement status. This may make our result sensitive
to the specification of the age function used in our model.
We control for wife’s and husband’s age fixed effects in the
baseline. As a robustness check, we instead use a third-
degree polynomial age function.20 The LATE estimate for
the alternative model is similar to the LATE estimate for the
baseline model (variation e).
The difference-in-difference estimates in Table 5 are
based on a somewhat less flexible specification than the
one we use in our IV baseline model. The main difference
was that we used a simple interaction between the treatment
group dummy and the year 2005 as an instrument rather than
a further interaction with the husband’s age dummies. We
now test if this latter interaction is necessary. Using a simple
single instrument shows that the LATE is similar to (but
slightly higher than) the baseline model (variation f). The
same holds if we estimate the second stage corresponding to
the first stage as shown in Table 6 (variation g). In Table 6
we employed a slightly more flexible functional form than
in Table 5, as we used the interactions of dummies for the
husband’s age categories 55–57 and 58–60 and the husband
being employed as a civil servant and the year 2005 as
the instruments.
19. The industry dummies are based on the 1993 version
of the NACE classification: Agriculture, forestry and fishery,
manufacturing, construction, retail, health care, catering and
retail, transportation and communication, asset management,
commercial services, education, temporary work (reference
category: other services).
20. Nonlinear husband’s/wife’s age effects enter the
model through the terms (husband’s age− 54), (hus-
band’s age− 54)2, (husband’s age− 54)3, (wife’s age− 31),
(wife’s age− 31)2, and (wife’s age− 31)3.
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TABLE B2
Placebo Test (IV Estimates)





Coefficient Std. Err. p Value Coefficient Std. Err. p Value
Predicted retirement status husband 0.1071 0.1978 0.588
Placebo instruments
Year 2005×Husband no civil servant ×Husband’s age 55 −0.0103 0.0033 0.002
Year 2005×Husband no civil servant ×Husband’s age 56 −0.0023 0.0039 0.566
Year 2005×Husband no civil servant ×Husband’s age 57 0.0053 0.0048 0.277
Year 2005×Husband no civil servant ×Husband’s age 58 0.0054 0.0057 0.345
Year 2005×Husband no civil servant ×Husband’s age 59 −0.0040 0.0064 0.529
Year 2005×Husband no civil servant ×Husband’s age 60 −0.0067 0.0127 0.597
F statistic instruments 14.68
N 95,141
Notes: See Table 8 for estimator, and baseline sample. In deviation from Table 8, the specification uses interactions of private
sector workers with age and year 2005 as instruments, and includes the interaction of civil servants and the year 2005 as control
variable. Other regressors as in Table 8.
TABLE B3
Robustness Checks on Functional Form Specification (IV Estimates)
Variation LATE Std. Err. p Value F stat.
Baseline (Table 8) 0.1042 0.0372 0.005 40.16
a. Wife’s retirement within 24 months 0.0941 0.0502 0.061 40.16
b. Incl. industry dummies for wives and husbands 0.1032 0.0370 0.005 40.60
c. Excl. wife’s, husband’s wage income [t − 1] 0.1051 0.0373 0.005 40.00
d. Excl. wife’s, husband’s hospitalization [t − 1] 0.1043 0.0373 0.005 40.11
e. Third degree age polynomial for both spouses 0.0950 0.0361 0.008 41.35
f. Single instrument: husband is civil servant in 2005 0.1212 0.0399 0.002 202.25
g. Two instruments: husband is civil servant in 2005 and husband is
aged 58–60 and civil servant in 2005
0.1092 0.0383 0.004 115.58
h. Third degree calendar year polynomial 0.1059 0.0373 0.005 39.98
i. Random effects 0.0911 0.0370 0.014 237.00†
Notes: See Table 8 for estimator, specification, and baseline sample. Variations alter, one by one, the functional form of the
regression equation (regressor set), without changing the sample selection (variations a–h), or control for random effects (RE)
(variation i). The first stages of variations f and g correspond to the models presented in Tables 5 and 6. †For the RE (variation
i), we display a Wald test statistic for joint significance (χ2 distributed).
B.3.5 Year polynomial
The way we control for variation in retirement rates over
years may affect our estimates as well. We control for year
fixed effects in our baseline model. Using a third degree
polynomial in year instead does not affect the LATE (variation
h), however.21
B.3.6 Random effects
We also estimate the IV model allowing for individual ran-
dom effects (RE) to verify whether individual time-constant
unobserved heterogeneity affects our result. We need to make
the strong assumption that the RE terms are orthogonal to the
included regressors in both equations of our IV model. Con-
sistent RE estimates may be characterized by higher effi-
ciency (lower standard errors), Table B3 (variation i) shows
that the LATE estimated using the RE model drops slightly
21. The polynomial terms are included as (year − 2000),
(year − 2000)2, and (year − 2000)3.
compared to the baseline. The significance drops too, how-
ever, possibly pointing at violation of the RE assumptions.
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